Despite repeated public statements by elected officials describing recent federal immigration enforcement as “unconstitutional,” no court has issued a final ruling to that effect. As of late January 2026, neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any state supreme court—including Vermont’s—has issued a merits ruling holding any current ICE policy or enforcement posture unconstitutional.

What does exist are ongoing lawsuits, temporary stays, and preliminary orders issued by lower courts. Those orders reflect a court’s assessment of litigation risk—typically that a plaintiff may be likely to succeed—not a finding that a law or policy violates the Constitution. A stay pauses conduct while a case proceeds; it is not a constitutional holding.

That distinction has largely been lost in public discourse.

In recent days, Vermont Gov. Phil Scott and at least one state legislator have joined a growing chorus of officials asserting that ICE enforcement actions are unconstitutional. The statements are categorical, but nonspecific. No particular statute, policy, or adjudicated ruling is cited. As used in these statements, “unconstitutional” functions as a conclusion rather than a citation.

At the same time, the debate over immigration enforcement continues to invoke public safety—either as justification for enforcement or as a reason to oppose it—without a corresponding accounting of consequences. While arguments are made in moral and legal terms, a basic question remains largely unanswered in the public record: how many violent crimes, or deaths, are at stake under competing enforcement choices?

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What courts have—and have not—ruled

Courts have long held that federal immigration enforcement is constitutional as a category. Congress has authority to legislate on immigration, and the executive branch has authority to enforce those laws. Courts regularly review how enforcement is carried out, not whether enforcement may exist at all.

In recent litigation, some lower courts have found specific tactics unlawful in specific circumstances—for example, warrantless home entries without a judge-signed warrant in a particular case. Those rulings are fact-bound and limited. They do not invalidate ICE authority generally, nor do they render all enforcement unconstitutional.

Similarly, courts have issued temporary restraining orders or stays related to enforcement activity pending litigation. Such orders preserve the status quo while courts consider claims. They are procedural tools, not determinations on constitutionality.

To date, no high court has resolved these questions, and no final ruling has declared any current ICE policy or enforcement posture unconstitutional.

The missing measurement

While legal claims are made with confidence, a parallel gap exists in the empirical debate. Despite years of argument over border and interior enforcement, there is no widely cited national study estimating policy-attributable violent crime or deaths—that is, how many Americans die or are victimized under stricter versus looser enforcement regimes.

This is not because public safety is irrelevant. It is because the measurement is difficult.

Producing such an estimate would require multiple steps: estimating the size of the unauthorized population; estimating violent offending rates for that population; accounting for repeat offenses and multiple victims; and constructing a counterfactual—what would occur under a different policy. Most research stops earlier, focusing on crime or victimization rate comparisons rather than downstream consequences.

The absence of a definitive number does not imply zero impact. It means the debate proceeds without quantified bounds.

Running a best-case scenario

In the absence of a comprehensive study, the only honest approach is to state assumptions explicitly and run transparent, best-case bounds—using assumptions most favorable to critics of enforcement.

Start with population. Pew Research Center estimates the unauthorized immigrant population at roughly 14 million in 2023, with higher estimates—approaching 20 million—often cited after subsequent migration surges. Taking that full range captures uncertainty.

Next, crime rates. Numerous studies argue that undocumented immigrants are less likely to commit violent crime than native-born Americans. To be maximally generous, assume an annual violent offending rate substantially lower than the general U.S. population—here illustrated as half the national rate.

Using a rough national baseline of approximately 0.5% annual violent offending, this yields an illustrative rate of 0.25% per year for the unauthorized population. This stacks the deck toward the lowest plausible outcome: annual offending rather than lifetime prevalence, no enforcement bias, and no inflation for repeat offenders.

Applying that rate:

• 14 million × 0.25% ≈ 35,000 violent crimes per year
• 20 million × 0.25% ≈ 50,000 violent crimes per year

These figures are not ICE estimates. They are not conviction counts. They are arithmetic consequences of the most favorable assumptions commonly advanced in public debate.

Translating scale

Large national numbers are often dismissed as abstract. Translating them provides context.

Burlington, Vermont’s largest city, has a population of approximately 44,000. Under the most optimistic assumptions, the implied annual violent-crime count associated with the unauthorized population is roughly equivalent to the population of Burlington—every year—spread across the country.

Averaged nationally, 50,000 violent crimes per year equates to about 1,000 per state. Crime is not evenly distributed, and smaller states would expect a smaller share. But smaller is not zero, and national policy does not exempt small states from national consequences.

Even a fraction of that total represents real victims, not abstractions.

Precision matters

None of this resolves the underlying policy debate. Reasonable people can disagree about enforcement priorities, resource allocation, humanitarian obligations, and civil liberties. Courts will continue to adjudicate specific claims.

But precision matters.

Calling enforcement “unconstitutional” without a ruling is not a statement of law. Invoking public safety without numbers is not an analysis. And rejecting enforcement on principle does not erase consequences; it redistributes them.

As of now, the record shows three things clearly:

1. No court has ruled any current ICE policy or enforcement action unconstitutional as a general matter.
2. Litigation is ongoing, and some tactics are contested, but those cases are unresolved.
3. The public debate proceeds without a quantified accounting of violent crime or deaths under alternative enforcement choices.

Those facts are not arguments. They are the situation.

Policy choices carry tradeoffs whether or not they are named. Pretending otherwise may be rhetorically satisfying, but arithmetic, like law, has a way of asserting itself eventually.

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Dave Soulia | FYIVT

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