Do Other States Get Sued Over Climate Targets? Vermont Can.

Do Other States Get Sued Over Climate Targets? Vermont Can.

When Vermont lawmakers passed the Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) in 2020, they tied the state’s climate targets to a broader national effort: the U.S. Climate Alliance, a coalition of states and territories committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement. Vermont joined the Alliance in 2017, and Alliance membership was frequently cited during debate as part of the justification for adopting Paris-aligned emissions benchmarks.

The Alliance’s near-term commitment is clear: reduce emissions 26–28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025. Vermont adopted the same timeframe in statute. But Vermont’s law is unusual even by international standards: it not only sets statutory emissions deadlines, it also explicitly authorizes ‘any person’ to sue the state over missed rulemaking deadlines or failure to achieve the required reductions. The GWSA created a private right of action allowing “any person” to sue the state if it fails to adopt rules sufficient to meet the statutory deadlines.

Now that 2025 has passed, Vermont officials have acknowledged the state is unlikely to meet its 2025 requirement. The law remains in effect, and the enforcement mechanism remains intact. That leaves Vermonters facing a practical question: how is the Alliance performing overall, and what does the available data actually show?

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What the U.S. Climate Alliance Reports

The U.S. Climate Alliance today includes more than twenty states along with Puerto Rico and Guam, representing a large share of the U.S. economy. In its 2025 annual report, the Alliance states that members collectively reduced net greenhouse gas emissions 24 percent below 2005 levels between 2005 and 2023. The report describes that outcome as “within the margin of error” of its 2025 target.

However, the same report makes clear that 2023 is the most recent year with complete historical emissions data. Emissions estimates for 2024 and 2025 are modeled projections rather than finalized inventories. In other words, the Alliance’s “2025 annual report” is not a definitive 2025 pass-or-fail scorecard. It is a progress report through 2023 combined with projections beyond that point, reflecting the typical lag in state greenhouse gas accounting.

The Alliance also does not publish a state-by-state list identifying which members have conclusively met the 26–28 percent benchmark and which have not. Its reporting is presented at the coalition-wide level, which can obscure substantial differences among individual states.

The report also notes that some sector-level emissions changes are influenced by short-term factors. For example, residential building emissions declined in 2023 in part due to warmer late-winter and early-spring weather reducing heating demand. While such variability is common in year-to-year inventories, it underscores that not all emissions reductions reflect structural policy changes alone.

The GDP Claim, and What It Does and Does Not Prove

The Alliance’s report emphasizes economic performance alongside emissions reductions. It states that member states’ combined real GDP increased 34 percent between 2005 and 2023 while emissions declined over the same period. The report presents this as evidence that economic growth and climate action are compatible.

A key limitation is that the report does not provide a comparison between member and non-member states’ economic growth, leaving unclear how Alliance states’ performance compares to the rest of the country. Over the same period, total U.S. real GDP increased by roughly 45 percent, a national figure that includes both Alliance and non-Alliance states. Without a member versus non-member breakdown, the GDP statistic demonstrates that growth occurred during emissions reductions, but it does not establish that Alliance membership produced uniquely stronger economic outcomes.

There is an additional complication: the Alliance did not exist in 2005. It began in 2017 with three founding states and expanded over time. As a result, a 2005–2023 GDP trend describes the long-run economic trajectory of today’s member states, but it does not isolate economic performance during the Alliance’s actual period of existence or adjust for changing membership.

A Standardized Federal Comparison Through 2022

To compare emissions reductions across states using a consistent methodology, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency maintains a state-level greenhouse gas inventory covering 1990 through 2022. While it does not yet extend through 2025, it provides a uniform baseline for evaluating trends.

Using that dataset, Alliance states collectively reduced gross emissions by roughly 18 percent from 2005 to 2022. Non-Alliance states reduced emissions by approximately 12 percent over the same period. Vermont’s reduction over that window is about 11 percent. These figures reflect emissions occurring within state borders and exclude certain land-use sequestration adjustments included in net emissions accounting.

The EPA data suggest that Alliance states, as a group, have reduced emissions somewhat faster than the rest of the country through 2022. At the same time, Vermont’s reduction remains well short of the pace implied by a 26–28 percent reduction target by 2025.

Because statewide inventories lag, complete 2025 emissions totals are not yet widely available. That makes it difficult, as of early 2026, to identify which states have definitively met the Alliance’s benchmark.

At Least One State Has Publicly Fallen Short

Public reporting indicates that Colorado, an Alliance member with an explicit statutory 2025 target, is not expected to meet that first major benchmark. Colorado’s experience is notable because it underscores that ambitious interim targets have proven challenging even in states with significant renewable potential and large natural landscapes.

Other states have described themselves as “on track,” but definitive, finalized 2025 inventory confirmations remain limited. The absence of clear state-by-state reporting leaves the Alliance’s collective progress claims difficult to verify at the level that matters most for statutory accountability.

Vermont’s Unique Legal Exposure

Vermont’s situation differs from most Alliance states because of the GWSA’s enforcement structure. Many states have adopted climate targets through executive orders or legislation without creating a broad private right of action. Vermont’s statute allows litigation if the state fails to implement rules sufficient to meet the targets.

State officials have indicated Vermont is unlikely to achieve the 2025 benchmark, yet the statutory framework remains unchanged. Several original supporters of the GWSA continue to hold influential positions in state government, and proposals to remove or narrow the enforcement mechanism have not succeeded.

That means coalition-level projections do not resolve Vermont’s legal obligations. Vermont’s targets are not merely aspirational; they remain enforceable deadlines under state law.

The Accountability Question Moving Forward

The U.S. Climate Alliance report presents a narrative of progress: emissions down, GDP up, and continued momentum toward long-term goals. But it does not provide a finalized state-by-state accounting of 2025 compliance, and it relies on emissions data complete only through 2023, with later years modeled.

For Vermont, where missed targets can still trigger lawsuits, those gaps are not academic. As policymakers debate additional measures such as the Clean Heat Standard and related regulatory tools, the central questions remain practical: how close is Vermont to its statutory targets using finalized data, how do Vermont’s reductions compare to peer states under consistent measurement standards, and what level of reduction is realistically achievable within the next decade?

The Alliance reports collective progress. Vermont acknowledges shortfall. The enforcement mechanism remains intact. Those facts, taken together, frame the climate policy debate Vermonters are now confronting beyond the 2025 milestone.

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Dave Soulia | FYIVT

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One response to “Do Other States Get Sued Over Climate Targets? Vermont Can.”

  1. H. Jay Eshelman Avatar
    H. Jay Eshelman

    The Vermont legislators who passed the ill-conceived GWSA were clearly grandstanding.

    Short of being voted out of office (unlikely as that is in a Dem/Prog majority State), they have no personal incentive to enter into reasonable contracts on behalf of the constituents they represent. They have no personal skin in the game – which is, of course, the overwhelming flaw in any socialist/Marxist collective form of governance.

    If, for example, we (as shareholders in our State enterprise) paid our legislators based on merit (i.e., predetermined and agreed upon goals – perhaps providing a financial bonus for targets met or a financial penalty for targets missed), our elected board of directors would be more careful to be sure that “…previous to any law being made to raise a tax, the purpose for which it is to be raised ought to appear evident to the Legislature to be of more service to community than the money would be if not collected.” – as dictated in Article 9 of the Vermont Constitution.

    Until then, our legislators will continue their folly of freely spending other people’s money in their struggle to think well of themselves without personal consequence.

    Key themes in Article 9 include:
    – A reciprocal duty (a contract): protection of rights in exchange for proportional contributions (taxes or service).
    – Protections against unconsented property takings (similar to eminent domain principles, requiring consent or legislative action).
    – Consent of the governed as the basis for laws.
    – A requirement for clear public benefit justification before imposing taxes.

    This article is often cited in discussions of taxation, property rights, conscription exemptions, and government legitimacy in Vermont. And we, most importantly, as the voters who elect our State’s board of directors (i.e., the legislature), have no one to blame but ourselves for electing these people in the first place

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