Judicial Independence on Trial in the VT Senate

Judicial Independence on Trial in the VT Senate

Over the course of a week, the Vermont Senate Judiciary Committee turned what is typically a low-profile exercise in advice and consent into a revealing examination of how the state understands judicial independence, professional duty, and the boundary between law and politics.

The hearings covered two nominations to the Vermont Supreme Court: Christina Nolan and Michael Drescher, whose appearances before the committee unfolded very differently. Taken together, they exposed a Judiciary Committee caught between Vermont’s historically nonpartisan judicial tradition and growing pressure to apply ideological tests to judicial candidates.

Two Nominees, Two Very Different Hearings

Nolan’s hearing followed the familiar Vermont script. Senators focused on experience, temperament, and the institutional role of the court in a small state where justices are expected to decide politically sensitive cases without becoming political actors themselves.

When questioned about the Vermont Constitution—most notably Article 22, which codified reproductive autonomy—Nolan declined to offer substantive interpretation, citing judicial ethics and the possibility that such issues could come before the court. She emphasized her obligation to apply the constitution as written and through precedent, not personal belief.

The exchange reflected the traditional boundaries of Vermont confirmation hearings, where nominees are typically vetted on fitness and conduct rather than ideological alignment.

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Amestoy’s Warning: Don’t Import National Confirmation Politics

Those boundaries were reinforced earlier in the week by testimony from retired Chief Justice Jeffrey Amestoy, who cautioned the committee against importing national confirmation politics into Vermont’s judicial process.

Amestoy warned that turning judicial confirmations into ideological sorting exercises risks undermining public trust in a court system that has historically depended on its perceived independence. He pointed to past Vermont justices who weathered intense public controversy during their careers only to be later recognized for their service, arguing that fidelity to process—not political alignment—has long been the state’s guiding standard.

His testimony set a tone of institutional restraint that would later collide with the debate surrounding Drescher’s nomination.

Drescher Nomination Becomes a Proxy Fight

When the committee turned to Drescher, the tone shifted sharply.

Rather than focusing on judicial temperament or interpretive approach, much of the questioning centered on his role as a federal government lawyer defending immigration detention decisions tied to the arrests of Mohsen Mahdawi and Mahmoud Khalil. Critics argued that the detentions were unconstitutional, retaliatory, or morally indefensible, and questioned whether someone who defended them—regardless of professional obligation—should be elevated to Vermont’s highest court.

Supporters countered that Drescher’s role was precisely what the adversarial system requires: a government advocate defending contested actions so courts can rule. They emphasized that the cases were civil habeas proceedings, not criminal prosecutions, and that Drescher had no unilateral authority to decline representation. Several witnesses argued that resigning in protest would not have halted the litigation but instead would have left the cases to be handled by political appointees from Washington, potentially weakening judicial oversight rather than strengthening it.

“Courage,” Resignation, and the Limits of Participation

The philosophical divide crystallized around a recurring question: at what point does participation in a contested government action become disqualifying, regardless of professional role or ethical conduct?

Sen. Philip Baruth (D/P Chittenden-Central District) framed the concern most directly, suggesting that even well-intentioned advocacy could become “indistinguishable from following orders” if the outcome perpetuates harm. Other senators pressed variations of the same theme, asking whether there is a moment at which cooperation with an administration’s policies—particularly in immigration enforcement—ceases to be morally viable.

Drescher did not retreat from his decisions. He told the committee that he would make the same choice again, arguing that remaining in place allowed him to protect staff, maintain professional standards, and ensure that courts had a full record on which to decide. Resignation, he said, would have been performative and counterproductive.

Institutional Stability Versus Moral Signaling

The divide was further highlighted by Sen. Christopher Mattos (R Chittenden-North District), who framed the issue in institutional terms. When the job gets hard, he said, he does not want judges—or lawyers—to walk away. Courts, unlike legislatures, cannot outsource their most difficult responsibilities. Vacancies, he warned, create opportunities for greater politicization, not less.

That exchange revealed the committee’s deeper tension: whether judicial fitness should be evaluated through the lens of public legitimacy and moral signaling, or through the practical consequences of maintaining stable, professional institutions capable of checking executive power.

An Absence of Vermont Constitutional Debate

Notably absent from the Drescher hearing was sustained discussion of how he would interpret the Vermont Constitution itself.

Despite hours of testimony invoking due process, free speech, and the courts’ role as a backstop against federal overreach, senators rarely asked how the nominee approaches Vermont constitutional interpretation as an independent body of law. The constitutional conversation remained largely abstract, focused on federal controversies rather than state jurisprudence.

That omission stood out, particularly given repeated references to the Supreme Court’s role in safeguarding rights within Vermont’s legal framework.

A Quiet Process Showing Signs of Strain

By the end of the week, the Judiciary Committee had done more than vet two nominees. It surfaced an unresolved question about Vermont’s judicial culture: whether the state will continue to evaluate judges primarily on competence, restraint, and fidelity to process, or whether national political battles will increasingly shape who is deemed fit to serve.

For now, the committee has offered no clear answer. But the contrast between a conventional confirmation hearing early in the week and a bruising, values-laden debate later suggests that Vermont’s historically quiet judicial nominating process may be entering a more contested phase.

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Dave Soulia | FYIVT

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One response to “Judicial Independence on Trial in the VT Senate”

  1. H. Jay Eshelman Avatar
    H. Jay Eshelman

    The glaring ingredient missing in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s reasonableness is exemplified by retired Chief Justice Jeffrey Amestoy’s caution against the importation of national confirmation politics into Vermont’s judicial process. What is the missing ingredient? Humility and Integrity.

    Our Vermont political landscape continues to be dominated by people like Amestoy and Baruth who believe their personal perspectives are the be-all and end-all of universal jurisprudence. No where is there a discussion of the over-arching subject of Federalism – the distinction between national and state governance. No where is there a discussion of Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, establishing that three governmental aspects are the “supreme Law of the Land”:
    – The U. S. Constitution itself.
    – Federal laws enacted by Congress that are consistent with (“in Pursuance” of) the Constitution, and
    – Treaties entered into by the United States.

    State judges must follow these federal sources. Any conflicting state constitution, law, or provision is overridden (“notwithstanding”).

    Article VI, Clause 2 ensures federal supremacy over conflicting state law, a cornerstone of American federalism. It prevents states from nullifying or ignoring valid federal authority.

    Many Vermonter’s are an egotistical lot who, as T. S. Eliot explained, justify their actions solely because “…they are absorbed in the endless struggle to think well of themselves.” More and more, Vermont governance appears to be a reincarnation of the sentiments expressed by the American Civil War Confederacy. In its ostensible declaration of freedom, Vermont has created slaves of its citizens. Free Enterprise, political, personal and economic, is the casualty.

    The collision of these sentiments in the debate surrounding Michael Drescher’s nomination was not only inevitable, it was the harbinger of what Vermonters can expect in the very near future, as their individual freedoms are eroded by the tyrannically omnipotent moral busybodies in Vermont’s government.

    “Beware that, when fighting monsters, you yourself do not become a monster… for when you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss gazes also into you.” ― Friedrich W. Nietzsche

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